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SYMPOSIUM COMMENTARY
MARKET CONFORMITY OF INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS: POLICY ISSUES OF THE
GERMAN INSOLVENCY LAW
Manfred Balz*
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of this conference suggests that a developed
rescue culture is more civilized than a liquidation culture, and
that we should all pray to be blessed with a Chapter 11.' Ac-
cording to the City of London folklore, which has traditionally
been sardonic about German business, Germany simply does
not have acceptable rescue manners. In short, Germans have
been depicted as rescue Neanderthals.
While this view may be valid under the existing
Konkursordnung of 18772 and the Vergleichsordnung of
1935,3 with their very inefficient composition or arrangement
* Dr. iur., Tfibingen; LL.M., Harvard Law School. General counsel, Deutsche
Telekom, Bonn. The author was general counsel of Treuhandanstalt (1990-1993)
and involved in the German insolvency law reform in the Federal Ministry of
Justice, Bonn (1983-1989). Beginning in 1989, he has served as the permanent
chairman of the European Union Council ad hoc "Bankruptcy" group negotiating
the European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of November 23, 1995. The
views expressed in this paper are entirely the author's and do not necessarily
reflect those of the institutions with which the author was or is affiliated.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994).
2. Konkursordnung [Bankruptcy Act], v. 10.2.1877 (Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl.]
S.351), translated in BUrMERWORTHS INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAWS 172 (Philip
Wood & Peter G. Totty eds., Martin G. Bates trans., 1994) [hereinafter Bankrupt-
cy Act]. For a brief legislative history, see Maximilian Schiessl, On the Road to a
New German Reorganization Law-A Comparative Analysis of the Draft Proposed
by the Insolvenzrechtskommission and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 62 Am.
BANKR. L.J. 233, 235-36 (1988).
3. Vergleichsordnung [Composition Act], v. 26.2.1935 (RGBl. I S.321), translat-
ed in BIurrERWORTHS INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAWS, supra note 2, at 216
[hereinafter Composition Act]. For a general discussion of the 1935 law, see
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proceedings,4 things may change (albeit not dramatically) un-
der the bankruptcy law reform enacted in 1994.' This law is
considered so radical that it was thought wise to postpone its
entry into force until January 1, 1999.6 I had the pleasure of
some involvement in the layout and drafting of this law.'
We in Germany think that the law should contain no bias
or built-in normative preference for rescue over liquidation.
Rescue should certainly not be prevented by inadequate rules
wherever it is in the best interest of claimants, i.e., where
rescue maximizes value. However, debtors should not be subsi-
dized at the expense of unwilling claimants, in order to benefit
rescues deemed to be in the public interest. We also think that
"Rescue or Liquidation?" is not a properly framed question and
does not reflect the range of options. Liquidation by way of a
liquidating plan, or through a sale of all or substantially all of
the assets of a debtor as a going concern, is probably the most
economically sound solution in most instances. For Germans,
sale of the going concern on the market, rather than sale to
existing claimants-as reorganization has been characterized
by critics of Chapter 11, such as Jackson8 and Baird--is gen-
erally preferable because it avoids delay, troublesome strategic
misbehavior by claimants, and worrisome valuation issues.
Thus, market sale of a going concern is the proper paradigm
under German notions of absolute priority for insolvent debt-
Schiessl, supra note 3, at 238-41.
4. See Klaus Wimmer, The New German Insolvency Statute: Part I, BANIKR.
CT. DECISIONS, July 2, 1996, at A3; Schiessl, supra note 3, at 233. In some ways,
German insolvency laws are no more inefficient than the U.S. system was under
chapter XI of the old Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. XI, 30 Stat.
544 (repealed 1978).
5. See Insolvenzordnung [Insolvency Act], v. 5.10.1994 (Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGB1.] I S.2866) (unofficial translation on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Inter-
national Law) [hereinafter Insolvency Act]; Einfiihrungsgesetz zur Insolvenzordnung
[Introductory Act to the Insolvency Act], v. 5.10.1994 (BGB1. I S.2911).
6. "This long postponement is due to the fact that the Federal Lander
(states), whose courts are to implement the new Insolvency Statute, have raised
fears that they will not be able to satisfy the increased demand on staffing for
several years." Wimmer, supra note 4, at A3.
7. The author of this paper was one of two draftsmen involved in framing
the new bankruptcy statute at the German Federal Ministry of Justice.
8. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LmITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 210-11 (1986).
9. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 14, 243
(1992); Thomas H. Jackson & Douglas G. Baird, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1984).
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ors, and it is only such debtors that come before the bankrupt-
cy courts in Germany.
II. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS
How is one to measure the benefit derived from a neatly
tailored bankruptcy system? The economic benefit of insolvency
proceedings is not easily measured. Despite widely varying
insolvency systems in countries with very similar economies,
there is hardly reliable evidence that rates of growth, prosperi-
ty, employment, or monetary stability are related in a concrete
way to the legal and institutional setup used for dealing with
business insolvencies.
Obviously, the effectiveness of a bankruptcy regime cannot
be measured by the number of proceedings, nor is the number
of successful reorganizations as compared with the number of
liquidations in bankruptcy an accurate indication of a success-
ful regime. In fact, there is no way of discerning the optimal
number of reorganizations. Contrary to popular belief, bank-
ruptcy liquidation is not an economic ill or a "destroyer" of
wealth. Rather, reallocating assets amidst the drama of bank-
ruptcy may be beneficial to the economy because idle factors of
production can be put to use more efficiently. Like the "cre-
ative destruction" wrought by technological innovation, liquida-
tion may have similar useful long-term effects."
Not even the viability of the reorganized entities that
bankruptcy laws produce is a valid measure of the laws' effec-
tiveness. The continued existence of reorganized firms may be
due to unfavorable conditions for structural change, to social
inertia, or to the lack of mobility in the labor force. The surviv-
al of firms is not, economically speaking, an appropriate end in
itself.
Finally, the dividend paid to creditors upon a bankruptcy
liquidation is not a suitable indicator of success. The dividend
will depend more on the credit system-especially the avail-
ability of secured credit, the equity ratio of a given industry, a
certain economic order, and the burden of social protection
imposed on firms and their creditors-than on bankruptcy law
itself.
10. See Wimmer, supra note 4, at A8.
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All of these considerations may appear trivial, but Germa-
ny has gone through a long and painful learning curve in
reaching these conclusions. If the impact of bankruptcy cannot
be measured, should we then recommend to our governments,
especially those with economies in transition, that they make
an arbitrary choice from the world's large menu of insolvency
systems? I do not think so. In recent years, the economic anal-
ysis of law and the schools of institutional economics have
yielded a number of reliable and precise precepts for the effi-
cient structuring of the insolvency process. Among economists,
it is undebatable that the goal of insolvency legislation is not
to produce X percent reorganizations and Y percent liquida-
tions, but rather to establish a structure that allows for effi-
cient decision making in individual cases, and that minimizes
losses to claimants and to the general economic environ-
ment."
III. MARKET CONFORMITY OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: THE
GERMAN REFORM
Until now, Germany has had one of the oldest bankruptcy
statutes in force, 12 accompanied by a statute on composi-
tions." After an unusually long and intense reform discussion
beginning in 1978,'1 the German legislature completely over-
hauled the existing insolvency law and created an entirely new
bankruptcy code (Insolvenzordnung)." The legislature drew
on an extensive comparative study of existing bankruptcy re-
gimes, and, for the first time in German legislative history, the
economic analysis of law and the precepts of institutional eco-
nomics had a direct and explicit impact on legislative policy.16
The new law reflects many elements of the most sophisti-
cated pre-existing bankruptcy regime, namely, the Bankruptcy
Code of the United States. However, the law expresses those
elements in a continental legislative style that makes them
11. See id.
12. Bankruptcy Act, supra note 2, 1877 RGB1. S.351.
13. Composition Act, supra note 3, 1935 RGB1. I S.321.
14. See Giinter Knorr et al., Germany, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INSOL-
VENGY LAW 207, 230 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1992).
15. Insolvency Act, supra note 5, 1994 BGBl. I S.2866.
16. See Manfred Balz, The European Convention on Insoluency Proceedings, 70
AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 491 n.23 (1996).
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attractive to Latin America and Eastern and Central Europe.
Moreover, the German reform takes into account the criticism
recently leveled by economic and legal scholars against the
U.S. reorganization procedure, and avoids some of the rightly-
criticized features of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The explicit objective of the new statute is to establish a
system that will provide market conformity of insolvency pro-
ceedings. The principle of the statute is that insolvency law
should not supersede market processes or negotiations among
the various classes of claimants, but rather should stimulate
and, wherever necessary, simulate efficient market exchange
processes. 7
The basic function of insolvency law is to correct, through
collective action, market failure caused by the large number of
unrelated claimants and their asymmetric information about
the state of the debtor's affairs, their respective behavior, and
the options for maximizing the value of the insolvent's estate.
This type of market failure has been studied by the economic
analysis of law as a "common pool" problem or a "prisoner's
dilemma."'8
The role of insolvency law is to organize collective action
in such a way that the value of the debtor's assets will be max-
imized and everyone involved will be better off than without
such action; in other words, to collectivize and rationalize debt
collection. 9 It is not a legitimate function of bankruptcy law
to maintain inefficient firms where such maintenance is not in
the interest of creditors, to protect the debtor from its credi-
tors, or to replace the rigor of general private and commercial
law with vague judicial equity.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An
Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399,
402 (1986); JACKSON, supra note 9, at 10-19; Manfred Balz, Aufgaben und Struktur
des kiinftigen einheitlichen Insolvenzverfahrens, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 271 (1988) thereinafter Balz, Aufgaben und Struktur]; Manfred
Balz, Logik und Grenzen des Insolvenzrechts, 9 ZEITSCHEIFT FOR
WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT 1438 (1988) [hereinafter Balz, Logik und Grenzen].
19. See Jackson, supra note 18, at 399.
1997]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
A. Structural Elements
The legislature viewed twelve structural elements of the
new German law as necessary prerequisites for the desired
market conformity of bankruptcy.
1. Unitary Proceedings
The new law introduced a unitary insolvency proceed-
ing.20 This proceeding differs from existing bankruptcy and
composition proceedings (i.e., Chapters 7 and 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code)21 in that it does not distinguish either the
procedural rules or the influence and exit rights of claimants
according to who files (i.e., the debtor or the creditor), or ac-
cording to which outcome of the proceedings is expected or
preferred by the petitioner (i.e., liquidation or reorganiza-
tion). All possible ways of dealing with the debtor's estate
(particularly piecemeal liquidation, the transfer of viable busi-
ness units to another entity or the reorganization of the debtor
entity, as well as all conceivable mixes of these solutions) may
be negotiated within a unitary set of rules. The objective of
unitary proceedings is to maximize the value of the estate for
the benefit of claimants according to their respective priority
(the so-called absolute priority rule).' This is why the pro-
ceedings are entirely creditor-driven and why the debtor has
no right to impose its will upon the creditor's interest or to
"play with the money of creditors."'
2. No Structural Bias or Normative Preference for
Reorganization
This element implies that there is no normative hierarchy
(as it exists, for example, in the French law) of outcomes in
bankruptcy.' Most of all, reorganization is not preferred over
liquidation, and an orderly liquidation with a sale of entire
20. See Klaus Kamlah, The New German Insolvency Act: Insolvenzordnung, 70
AM. BANKR. L.J. 417, 424 (1996).
21. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766, 1101-1174 (1994).
22. See Balz, supra note 16, at 491 n.23.
23. See id.
24. Id.; see Klaus Wimmer, The New German Insolvency Statute: Part II,
BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, July 16, 1996, at A5.
25. See Balz, supra note 16, at 491 n.23.
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business units is not generally preferred over the piecemeal
liquidation of the debtor's assets.26 It is primarily for creditors
to decide which solution serves their interests best and to im-
pose that solution upon the debtor and the equity holders."
3. Involvement of All Claimants in the Collective Process
The present German law suffers from the fact that action
by secured creditors is not stayed automatically by the opening
of bankruptcy proceedings; rather, secured creditors may con-
tinue individual actions against the debtor." The new law
subjects all individual action, including action by secured credi-
tors,29 to a stay. Moreover, subordinated debt (such as subor-
dinated shareholder loans, claims for interest on pre-bankrupt-
cy debt, etc.), which was excluded from insolvency proceedings
under the old law, will be treated within insolvency proceed-
ings," in order to allow a complete financial restructuring of
the debtor enterprise and to enforce the absolute priority rule.
Unless a plan makes other provisions, the debtor or equity
holders will not receive value from the estate unless all credi-
tor claims-including subordinated claims, such as claims for
post-bankruptcy interest-have been met in full.3 '
Unsecured creditors are to be adequately compensated for
expenses incurred by the estate in identifying and selling col-
lateral owned by secured creditors.32 Any creditor may, how-
ever, "oversecure" itself in such a fashion that these costs are
covered by the value of the collateral; it therefore receives full
payment of its claim."3
26. See JACKSON, supra note 8, at 211, 212.
27. See generally MANFRED BALZ, SANIERUNG VON UNTERNEHMEN ODER VON
UNTERNEHMENSTRAGERN (1986); JACKSON, supra note 8, at 211-12.
28. Insolvency Act, supra note 6, §§ 47-51, 1994 BGBl. I S.2872.
29. Set-offs, however, are not included, in contrast to the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. Compare id. §§ 94-96, 1994 BGBl. I S.2877-78, with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7)
(1994).
30. Insolvency Act, supra note 5, § 39, 1994 BGB. I S.2871; see Kamlah,
supra note 21, at 430-31 & n.131.
31. See Insolvency Act, supra note 5, § 199, 1994 BGB1. I S.2892.
32. See id. § 171, 1994 BGBl. I S.2888.
33. This is a general principle of secured credit law in Germany and is not
officially codified. During the debate over insolvency reform there was some discus-
sion of amending the general law to cover this area; however, in the end, it was
felt unnecessary to include any special provision in this regard.
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4. No Interference with, but Full Recognition of, Pre-
bankruptcy Entitlements
In order to minimize repercussions of bankruptcy on out-
side market processes (especially on the credit system), to
avoid misuse of insolvency as a tool for cost reduction and a
parameter of competition among enterprises in a given indus-
try, and to forestall strategic uses of bankruptcy petitions, the
opening of proceedings must not weaken or redistribute valu-
able pre-bankruptcy entitlements, such as title in movables
sold under a reservation of title clause or the right to set off
claims against counterclaims of the debtor. Interference with
pre-bankruptcy contracts must be reduced to the minimum
required for a workable collectivization of debt enforcement. In
particular, the economic value of security interests must be
fully protected in collective proceedings.
5. Abolition of Priorities for Pre-bankruptcy Classes of
Claimants
The traditional privileges and priorities for certain classes
of pre-bankruptcy creditors (typically the fiscal authorities or
the workers) revalue or reinflate depreciated claims by the
very fact of insolvency. Priorities in bankruptcy, as opposed to
out-of-bankruptcy wealth allocation redistribute wealth under
a presumed standard of equity. In line with the full recognition
of pre-bankruptcy entitlements and the mandate against bank-
ruptcy-specific revaluation of pre-bankruptcy entitlements, the
new law abolishes all bankruptcy-specific priorities for pre-
bankruptcy claimants.34
6. Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors Against Delay
Delay of bankruptcy proceedings affects various classes of
claimants differently by withholding the eventual payment of
their claims. Junior classes, equity holders, individual credi-
34. See Wimmer, supra note 24, at A7., Workers are protected for arrears up
to three months by a special social security system financed by the non-insolvent
firms in Germany (Konkursausfallgeld). See id. The reform does not touch the
administrative priority of post-bankruptcy claims (trustee loans, for example), a
policy which is fully in harmony with the ideal of market conformity and which is
one of the most significant advantages of formal insolvency proceedings over out-of-
court winding-up procedures or work-outs.
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tors, and-above all-unsecured creditors, whose claims and
interests are, normally, fully or largely depreciated by insol-
vency, have an incentive "to play with the money" of senior
classes, especially secured creditors, by delaying proceed-
ings.35 Market conformity requires that those interested in
delay pay those who are interested in avoiding it." The new
German law, therefore, affords protection to secured creditors
through regular payments of the agreed interest on their se-
cured claims despite the automatic stay. 7 Thus, the incentive
for junior classes and for the trustee to prolong proceedings is
strongly reduced.
7. Allocating Influence and Voting Rights to Determine the
Course of Proceedings According to the Real (Not Nominal)
Value of Claims
Another precept derived from market conformity is that
influence and voting rights of claimants in creditor meetings
should be apportioned according to the real (i.e., insolvency)
value of entitlements, and not from the nominal amount. Thus,
secured creditors would have more say than unsecured cred-
itors in a real world situation where, as is the case in Germa-
ny, some seventy-five percent of debtor assets are encumbered
with security interests. 8 In this respect, the new law falls
short of previous drafts by allocating voting rights in the
creditors' meetings, for simplicity's sake, according to the
amount of claims of all non-subordinated creditors, irrespective
of the secured or unsecured character of these claims.39
However, the law gives creditors the right to determine
whether the debtor should remain in possession, and to deter-
35. See Jackson, supra note 18, at 411-12. He notes:
In a world in which delay is inevitable, but the quantity of delay is not,
there is no reason not to impose the possible costs of delay on the group
that might benefit from it. Only by doing so can one try to ensure that
there is no incentive to delay simply for the sake of playing with some-
one else's money.
Id. at 414; see Balz, Logik und Grenzen, supra note 18, at 1438, 1441.
36. See Jackson, supra note 18, at 411-12.
37. Insolvency Act, supra note 5, § 169, 1994 BGBI. I S.2888.
38. This is a cautious estimate. According to one source published in 1978, on
average, 87% of the value of bankrupts' estates were paid out to secured creditors.
See GESSNER ET AL., DIE PRAXIS DER KONKURSABWICKLUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND 43,
171 (1978). More recent data, however, are not available.
39. Insolvency Act, supra note 5, §§ 235-238, 1994 BGBI. I S.2896-97.
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mine which person should serve as a trustee entirely to the
creditors.40 The appointment of a trustee will be final, even if
the debtor will be rehabilitated. The debtor cannot hope to
remain in possession when it files voluntarily for a reorganiza-
tion proceeding. The debtor has, from the beginning of the
unitary proceedings, no exclusive right to propose a plan, and a
debtor plan will in no way be preferred over a plan proposed
by other parties.4
8. Providing Cash and Non-cash Solutions for Both
Liquidations and Rehabilitations of the Debtor Business
Both liquidations and rehabilitations may be effectuated
for cash or non-cash compensation of claimants, as each credi-
tor may determine. A piecemeal liquidation or sale of the going
concern out of the estate will normally be for cash compensa-
tion, paid from the proceeds received from purchasers under
the distribution rules governing liquidations.
Not only may reorganizations of the debtor be carried out
under a plan, but piecemeal or orderly liquidations may be
carried out under a liquidating plan whereby parties-in-inter-
est may provide for non-cash compensation of some or all class-
es, and may depart from the liquidation scheme of distribution.
The new law addresses, in an internationally unique way,
the problem of insider dealing in insolvencies, both with re-
spect to liquidation sales and to reorganization or liquidating
plans.42 Insider dealing is a special problem in transition
economies where debtors, managers or groups of owners may
be interested in using bankruptcy to cancel previous debt and
purchase the assets from the estate for a low price.43
9. Flexible Classification of Claims and Interests in a Plan
The "insolvency plan" allows claimants at any stage of a
proceeding to negotiate for a solution which departs from the
mechanics of a liquidation and approximates the ideal of
40. See Kamlah, supra note 20, at 432.
41. See id.
42. For a detailed discussion, see Manfred Balz, Some Capital Market Aspects
of Bankruptcy-Asymmetric Information, Multiple Rank Ownership, External Effects
and Voting Leverage, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING: LAW AND PRACTICE 287, 287-
308 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991).
43. See id.
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Pareto optimality (wherein no party is worse off than in any
alternative solution, and where one or more parties fare bet-
ter)." This ideal of negotiations is reached by a potential con-
sensus.
By allowing a flexible classification of rights and interests
which follow not only legal criteria, but also differing economic
interests, a bankruptcy plan will serve the interests of all bet-
ter than will the schematic regime of statutory liquidation. All
members of a class must be treated alike, but various classes
of claimants who would have equal rank in a liquidation may
be classified and treated differently by a plan.45 Thus, for in-
stance, a plan may give different treatment to liquidated and
unliquidated or contingent claims (e.g., the claims arising from
asbestos risks in the famous Manville46 case). Likewise, trade
and bank credits, or general claims and insider claims (for
example, of shareholders or relatives of the debtor), may be
differentiated.
10. Adequate Minority Protection for Each Claimant
Voting procedures in insolvency serve the exclusive pur-
pose of overcoming the common pool problem that stems from
the plurality of unrelated actors.' Voting procedures do not
serve a political purpose, as in the political majority rule. In
the world of economics, there is no reason to believe that a
majority is better able to determine what is good for dissenting
individuals. Freedom of investment, essential to a market
system, requires that no individual be forced to invest or rein-
vest the liquidation value of its entitlement (i.e., the liquida-
tion value) into a reorganization or other solution which a
majority may desire. Therefore, under the new law, a plan may
be confirmed by the court only when each dissenting individual
claimant receives the full cash equivalent of its claim as that
claim would be realized in a best-case liquidation.48
44. See Wimmer, supra note 24, at A6.
45. See Insolvency Act, supra note 5, § 226(2), 1994 BGB1. I S.2895; see also
Kamlah, supra note 21, at 431.
46. In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82 B 11,656 to 82 B 11,676 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982).
47. See supra text accompanying note 19.
48. Insolvency Act, supra note 5, § 251, 1994 BGB1. I S.2898.
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11. Overcoming Obstruction by Groups Through "Cram-down"
A plan may be confirmed against the will of an impaired
dissenting class of claimants or against the will of the debtor,
when the class or debtor receives the full liquidation value of
its claims or interests, and when it is treated fairly and ade-
quately as against all other classes. This rule is derived, in
essence, from section 1129 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 9 but
is greatly simplified for the use in a civil law system.
A class is considered to be treated adequately and fairly
when: (1) no other claimant or class receives more than the full
amount of its claims; (2) neither the debtor nor any junior
claimant or class receives any value; and (3) no claimant or
class with equal liquidation rank receives better treatment
than the dissenting class.5"
12. Introducing a Discharge (Fresh Start) for Honest
Individual Debtors
Following Anglo-Saxon models, the new statute grants
honest debtors a discharge from their pre-bankruptcy debt
under certain conditions.5 The law blends elements of both
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 discharge of the U.S. law and avoids
the potential for misuse that is inherent in the two American
models. In order to be relieved from her debts, the debtor must
not only leave her existing assets to the trustee for the pay-
ment of creditor claims, but, for a duration of seven years, she
must also assign any garnishable future income from work to a
trustee who will ratably distribute the income to insolvency
creditors.52
While such a rule is not necessarily implicit in the logic of
insolvency law as a response to the common pool problem, it
can be expected to enhance creditors' chances to be paid, and it
is not contrary to market principles." Surprisingly for some,
it has been hailed by a large segment of the consumer credit
industry.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1994).
50. See Balz, Aufgaben und Struktur, supra note 18, at 273-87.
51. Insolvency Act, supra note 5, §§ 286-303, 1994 BGBl. I S.2902-05.
52. See id. § 287(2), 1994 BGBI. I S.2902-03.
53. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1995); Balz, Logik und Struktur, supra note 18, at
1438, 1444.
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The seven-year period may be too long for transition econ-
omies, but there is a strong argument in favor of introducing
the concept of discharge in bankruptcy into the systems of
transition economies. Entrepreneurial talent and personal
initiative will no doubt be an especially scarce resource there,
and an insolvent individual should not be blocked for life from
making a fresh start in the private sector.
IV. CONCLUSION
The German bankruptcy system has considerable appeal
to transition economies. For example, the Parliament of Bul-
garia recently enacted a very modern insolvency law which
contains the essential elements of market conformity as in the
new German Insolvenzordnung.54
54. The Bulgarian legislature received legislative advice by a mission of the
International Monetary Fund, in which Henry Schiffman of the International Mon-
etary Fund and the author of this paper participated.
19971 179

